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1Summary
The essay documents indications for “cracks” in the transatlantic relationship, identi-
fies their potential causes, and outlines possible policy responses. Taking up Fuku-
yama's question of whether the West “is still a coherent concept,” we draw attention to
the growing dissensus in the fields of environmental politics, security, and human
rights. Subsequently, we offer preliminary explanations for these developments based
on three leading schools of thought in International Relations. These explanations
make reference to the distribution of power in the international system (realism), di-
vergent ideas about the nature and the locus of the democratic legitimization of poli-
tics (constructivism), and the configuration of societal interests within states (liberal-
ism). Finally, we come up with some ideas on how to mend the cracks that have ap-
peared in the West, again drawing on the conceptual resources provided by the three
schools of thought.
1. Introduction: The “Cracks in the West” thesis*
After the end of the Cold War, both political scientists and journalists were facing the
question of which global political constellation would take its place and which forces,
tendencies, and conflicts would determine the fate of the world in the years and dec-
ades to come. The most famous – and infamous – answer was given by Samuel
Huntington, when he identified the “Clash of Civilizations” as the sign of the new
era1. Other – no less ambitious – analyses came to much more optimistic conclusions,
the most prominent of these being Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the “End of History,”
which he published in 1989.2 This dramatically-sounding formula reflects his view
that liberalism, i.e. the practically tested unity of democracy, free market economy,
and human rights, has won the final victory in the competition of political ideas – a
competition, which Fukuyama (following Hegel) sees as the central underlying proc-
ess and the decisive impetus of world history.
Today, at a time when it seems obvious that anti-Western sentiment and violence-
prone Islamism are gaining ground, this diagnosis may appear to have proven wrong.
Fukuyama is unabashed, though. In a recently published article,3 he points out that
                                                
* We wish to thank Martin Beck for comments and Hans Seidenstücker for translating the original
German article.
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, in: Foreign Affairs 72 (1993) 3, pp. 22-49; see
also Huntington., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Riverside, NJ 1996.
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, in: The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.; see
also Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York 1992.
3 Francis Fukuyama, The West May Be Cracking. Europe and America, International Herald Tribune,
2none of the anti-liberal fundamentalisms – and his thesis is solely addressing these –
has succeeded in establishing itself as a serious alternative to the liberal model, which
continues to be perceived as attractive and preferable by those peoples who – like the
Iranians or the Afghans – have experienced the consequences of its realization in po-
litical praxis.
In this essay we are not concerned with whether or not Fukuyama’s view concerning
the “End of History” is tenable. Rather, we are looking at the thesis which is at the
center of his more recent article. Not only is this new thesis just as noteworthy as his
earlier one; it is indeed little short of stunning given the view he argued fourteen years
ago. Fukuyama raises the question as to whether we are witnessing the rise of a new
(and so far most improbable) ideological conflict of global political importance. This
conflict (pace Huntington) is waged not between the West and “the rest,” but rather
within the West itself – i.e. between the United States on one side and many of its
Western, particularly European, partners on the other. Fukuyama asks “whether ‘the
West’ is really a coherent concept,” and proceeds to suggest a negative answer.4
There is much to be said for Fukuyama’s assessment. In the past few years and par-
ticularly since the onset of the presidency of George W. Bush, points of friction in the
transatlantic relationship have increased and intensified to such an extent that it now
seems appropriate to speak of a significant deterioration, if not crisis, of intra-Western
relations. True, these relations have never been completely free either of conflicts
about means or of conflicts about interests (distributional conflicts). However, the cur-
rent differences in opinion appear to be more significant and far-reaching than in the
past. Furthermore, they are accompanied by deeper disagreements which extend to
notions of legitimacy, and therefore call into question the “transatlantic value commu-
nity.”5 
Recently, we have witnessed a particularly sharp deterioration in the German-
American relationship, after Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used peculiarly critical and
                                                                                                                                                       
August 9, 2002; see also Fukuyama, U.S. vs. Them. Opposition to American Policies Must not Be-
come the Chief Passion in Global Politics, Washington Post, September 11, 2002.
4 See also Henry Kissinger, Die Risse werden größer, Welt am Sonntag, December 1, 2002. For a
similar voice from this side of the Atlantic see Werner Weidenfeld, Kulturbruch mit Amerika? Das
Ende transatlantischer Selbstverständlichkeit, Gütersloh 1996.
5 For the distinction between conflicts about values, means, and interests, see Volker Rittberger / Mi-
chael Zürn, Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West Relations. Causes and Consequences of East-
West Regimes, in: International Regimes in East-West Politics, ed. Volker Rittberger, London / New
York 1990, pp. 9-63. For an interpretation of NATO as a security community see Thomas Risse-
Kappen, Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO, in: The Culture of Na-
tional Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, New York 1996, pp.
357-399. 
3clear words, while commenting on U.S. plans to bring about a “regime change” in Iraq
by the use of force. This behavior contrasts sharply with previous instances of trans-
atlantic disagreements, in which Germany used to play the role of middleman. In our
view, people on both sides of the Atlantic cannot be indifferent to the developments
regarding both the intra-Western relationship in general and the German-American
relationship in particular. Both sides benefit from a transatlantic relationship that
(compared to what is the norm in international relations) is characterized by a high
degree of reciprocal respect and mutual trust, and they do so especially at a time when
transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction create
new and serious risks to international security. Hence, whether they realize it or not,
everybody stands to lose if the decision makers and peoples allow this relationship to
suffer.6  
2. Taking Stock: What Points to the Existence of Cracks in the West?
2.1. Growing Dissensus over Environmental, Security, and Human Rights Poli-
tics
In the past few years, and particularly since the Republican Bush, Jr. replaced the
Democrat Clinton in the White House, the governments on both sides of the Atlantic
have repeatedly, and it seems, increasingly, been unable to reach agreement on im-
portant issues or at least to find mutually acceptable compromises. Among these con-
flicts controversies over economic matters appear to be least threatening to the trans-
atlantic relationship. For one thing, trade disputes have long been a familiar feature of
this relationship. Perhaps even more important, they take place within the framework
of established rules, namely those of the WTO, which effectively limit their divisive
potential. Yet, controversies have also become more frequent in other issue areas such
as environmental policy, security policy, and even questions of human rights.
                                                
6 A glance at some basic data gives an idea of what is at stake economically. European and U.S. com-
panies invest more in each other’s economies than in the economies of all other regions of the world
combined. “Despite all the rhetoric of an ‘Asian century’ one has to acknowledge that during the past
eight years [1994-2001] the American economy has invested ten times more in the Netherlands than
in China. The European economy produced more than 60% of all new jobs created by foreign inves-
tors in the U.S.” (Daniel  S. Hamilton,  Die Zukunft ist nicht mehr, was sie war. Europa, Amerika und
die neue weltpolitische Lage, Stuttgart: Robert-Bosch-Stiftung, 2002, pp. 29f.). The linkages between
the German and American economies are also very considerable: $ 17.8 billion of a total of $ 95.7
billion foreign direct investment in Germany in 2001 came from U.S. investors. Concerning the re-
verse capital flow, the numbers are even more significant: of the gross new investment (direct invest-
ment) amounting to 122.5 billion Euro which German companies invested abroad in 2001, 41.8%
(51.2 billion Euro) went to the U.S. – by far more than to any other country. The United Kingdom
follows second by a large margin (16.8 billion Euro) ([http://www.bundesbank.de/hv/bw/download/
berichte/direkt01.pdf] Rev. 2002-12-29). A sustainable decline of this share due to a continued dete-
rioration of the German-American relationship would result in far-reaching negative consequences
that could hardly be compensated. 
4A common and disturbing trait of many of these conflicts is that the United States, to
the frustration of many Europeans, does not merely push for solutions different than
those favored by the Europeans, but is unwilling to bear the costs of compromise and
decides to “go it alone.” Examples include the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto
process, which the Europeans see as an indispensable instrument for mitigating the
effects of climate change, or its refusal to join the great majority of states (including
all EC members) in ratifying the Convention on Biological Diversity.
When it comes to international security and especially to arms control, the United
States has repeatedly preferred unilateralism over international cooperation. In some
cases the U.S. government has withdrawn support for international agreements which
it had previously advocated and whose stipulations, to a large extent, reflect U.S. pref-
erences. The reservations of many European allies notwithstanding, the U.S. has with-
drawn from the ABM treaty with Russia, in order to be able to develop and deploy a
missile defense system, which, as many Europeans fear, might destabilize nuclear de-
terrence or pave the way to a new nuclear arms race. Likewise, the U.S. has blocked a
proposed monitoring and verification scheme intended to give teeth to the Biological
Weapons Convention, weakened effective measures to curb illicit trade in small arms,
rejected the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and – through a Sen-
ate vote – declined to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which had
been negotiated for forty years. Through each of these choices, the U.S. has, from the
viewpoint of most European governments, hampered or prevented  progress concern-
ing vital questions of international security.
Finally, the United States has made decisions concerning human rights issues that
have considerably irritated the Europeans. A prominent example is the project of an
International Criminal Court intended to punish and deter genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. Not only has the U.S. “unsigned” the Rome Statute and thus
renounced a project that is deemed most important by many European governments.
The U.S. is even actively obstructing the establishment of the court by putting pres-
sure on states willing to cooperate. Moreover, this case adds to a list of earlier human
rights disagreements between the U.S. and a majority of the world community, in-
cluding the controversial use of the death penalty.7
                                                
7 For a detailed listing of cases in which the U.S. have obstructed or thwarted cooperation efforts by
the international community, see P.J. Simmons, Global Challenges. Beating the Odds, Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Policy Brief No. 17, August 2002) [http://
www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief17.pdf] Rev. 2002-11-11.
52.2.  The Dissensus over Dealing with “Rogue States”
Nowhere is the transatlantic division more spectacular and explosive today than when
it comes to the question of how to respond to the threats posed by transnational Is-
lamic terrorism and those so-called rogue states which – according to circumstantial
evidence – are seeking to acquire, and may be inclined to spread, ABC-weapons and
appropriate delivery systems. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, in
New York and Washington, D.C., which caused strong dismay and genuine compas-
sion for the victim(s) not only in Western countries, the U.S. enjoyed a high degree of
sympathy. Its leaders knew – recall Chancellor Schröder’s pledge of “unconditional
solidarity” – that they could count on the active support from their old and some new
partners to prevent the repetition of such tragic events. The “war against terrorism,”
which was first waged against Afghanistan, the logistical base of al-Qaida, received
the approval of the United Nations Security Council and was supported by NATO –
even though the broad and vague character of American goals in this war soon caused
some concern with European decision-makers and observers, and despite the fact that
this war – in contrast to the Kosovo conflict – was and is waged bypassing NATO.
The tide turned, however, when, after the military victory over the Taliban regime and
the subsequent apparent (though hardly decisive) weakening of the al-Qaida network,
a new target appeared in the American crosshairs: Iraq. After the devastating attacks
of September 2001, which literally hit the U.S. out of the blue, the Bush administra-
tion has concluded that in order to safeguard its national security (but also the security
of allied and friendly states) it may be necessary to “pre-empt” state or non-state ag-
gression through military action. In the “National Security Strategy” published in
September 2002, the U.S. goes so far as to declare this option part of its foreign policy
doctrine, terming it “a distinctly American internationalism.”8 A further strategy pa-
per, published in December 2002, specifies the targets of such “pre-emptive meas-
ures” as adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Even the use of
                                                
8 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington,
D.C. 2002 [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf] Rev. 2002-11-11. – Cf.  Peter Rudolf, "Präventivkrieg"
als Ausweg? Die USA und der Irak, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-Studie S 23,
June 2002) as well as Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, Amerikas Mission. Eine Analyse der nationalen Sicher-
heitsstrategie der Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-Aktuell No.
38, October 2002). In German treatments of the topic, the standard translation of “pre-emptive” is
“präventiv.” By contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon debate, a distinction is made between prevention and
pre-emption: while the first is targeted against merely potential dangers and is, as such, illegitimate,
the latter is seen as a state’s legitimate response to an imminent attack. Cf. Michael Walzer, Just and
Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, New York 1977, pp. 74-85. A classic
example for a pre-emptive strike occurred in June 1981, when Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor
construction site Ossirak, without prior consultation. While this action was strongly condemned by the
Security Council in Resolution 487 (1981), it was secretly welcomed by many Western countries. Cf.
Max Jakobson, Shades of Roosevelt and Stalin. Preemption, International Herald Tribune, October
17, 2002.
6nuclear weapons against these opponents is taken into consideration.9 Regarding the
use of military force, the U.S. government does not want to leave the final decision to
the United Nations or even to NATO. Rather, the Bush administration reserves to the
U.S. the right to act, if necessary, unilaterally and without the approval of the interna-
tional community or of its allies. This runs counter to both the established and ap-
proved practice of containment towards so-called states of concern (such as Iraq or
North Korea) and the principle of mutual consultation, at least with the transatlantic
partners, on decisions of utmost importance for international security.
The Bush, Jr. administration Washington perceives Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (in con-
trast to, for instance, India or Pakistan) as a WMD-armed adversary and, thus, as a
potential threat to the security of the United States, its allies, and the states in the re-
gion. President Bush and his advisors believe that, if this adversary is not stopped in
time, it could develop into a manifest and then possibly uncontrollable threat. The
U.S. is convinced that the Iraqi leadership, which has proven its unscrupulousness
more than once, continues to seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction as well as –
possibly with North Korean assistance – long-range delivery systems. The UN in-
spection and sanctions regime has, at best, been able to delay this process. In the end,
this threat can only be removed by an Iraqi “regime change,” which, barring the un-
likely case of Saddam Hussein going into exile, requires massive military interven-
tion. Furthermore, the U.S. justifies such an enforced regime change by the vision of a
positive “domino effect,” where a liberated Iraq becomes the core of a process of
eventual democratization of every authoritarian regime in the Middle East. This de-
mocratization would facilitate a reliable cooperation between the states of the region
and with the U.S. as well as other Western countries. It would also defuse the security
dilemma in the region and could open up completely new perspectives for the man-
agement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, from the U.S. point of view, the
democratization of the Middle East would result in a reduction of social frustrations
and thus dry out the breeding ground of violent Islamic extremism.10
                                                
9 The White House, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington
D.C. 2002 [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf] Rev. 2002-12-29.
10 In speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on February 26, 2003, President Bush stated:
“A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations
in the region. (…) Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in
motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. The passing of Saddam Hussein's re-
gime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers
rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support
for terror will not be tolerated.” ([http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-
11.html] Rev. 2003-02-27); see also Herfried Münkler, Blockierte Entwicklung. Über amerikanische
Motive für einen weiteren Golfkrieg, Frankfurter Rundschau, November 29, 2002.
7From the perspective of the (continental) European partners,11 this scenario may be
desirable, but quite unlikely. They take seriously the warnings of Arab governments
that a military intervention in Iraq could easily result in a unprecedented and uncon-
trollable spread of violence in the region, which could also adversely affect Israel and
which – through the Muslim minorities in Europe – might also have a negative impact
on the security in their own countries. The Europeans do not expect a military inter-
vention in Iraq to result in a significant push for democratization – neither in the re-
gion nor elsewhere. Rather than kicking off the mentioned “positive domino effect,”
an intervention would result in fueling anti-Western sentiment and strengthening Is-
lamist violence-prone forces in the Middle East. Indeed, the Muslim fundamentalists
might end up making large strides toward their declared objective, namely to over-
throw the corrupt, traditional regimes and replace them with revolutionary theocracies.
In addition, Europeans governments question the willingness of the United States to
commit the resources necessary to transform a militarily defeated Iraq into a decently
functioning democracy. This, they are convinced, would require the U.S. (as was the
case in Germany and Japan) to remain engaged for many years with troops, economic
aid and cultural influence in the country – a project that, as the Europeans see it, en-
joys neither sufficient public support in the U.S. nor the necessary political will on the
part of the administration in Washington. At the same time, they view themselves as
incapable of shouldering that burden in the Americans’ stead. Europeans and espe-
cially the German government point out that, with the “war against terrorism” (which
they insist has nothing to do with the Iraqi threat) far from being over, it is too early to
open a “second front.” Not only would this new war tie up military and financial re-
sources badly needed in other parts of the world; it would also undermine the political
and diplomatic conditions – i.e. the “alliance against terror,” which includes Islamic
countries – necessary for successfully combating transnational terrorist networks.12
Finally, the Europeans fear its consequences for the world economy, at a time when
global economic prospects are rather dim anyway.13
                                                
11 The United Kingdom adopts a different perspective, leaning towards the U.S. view. [In the mean-
time, further European states including Spain, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic have sided with the U.S. and the UK on this issue, whereas France, Germany, Bel-
gium and others have stood their ground and even reinforced their opposition to a military solution.
See “Die Erklärung der acht europäischen Regierungschefs,” Spiegel Online, January 30, 2003
[http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,232948,00.html] Rev. 2003-03-12.]
12 The German foreign minister Fischer emphasized this argument in his address to the UN Security
Council on January 20, 2003 ([http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/] Rev. 2003-
01-21).
13 As early as September 12, 2002, German finance minister Hans Eichel, speaking on the TV talk
show “Berlin Mitte,” warned that a “war in Iraq would certainly result in a rapid jump of oil prices
and, subsequently, in significant global economic turbulence ([http://www.heute.t-online.de/
ZDFheute/artikel/0,1367,WIRT-0-2014578,00.html] Rev. 2003-01-15).  
8In the spring and summer of 2002, all indications seemed to point towards the Bush,
Jr. administration dealing with the Iraq problem largely irrespective of the views of
the international community. Therefore, the Europeans were much relieved (as was
the rest of the world), when, in September 2002, the U.S. administration proved will-
ing to support a multilateral approach and to pressure Saddam Hussein through the
UN Security Council, offering him a final opportunity of avoiding war by fully com-
plying with relevant Security Council resolutions and cooperating with the weapons
inspectors. In the debate that preceded the new Security Council resolution (SC-Res.
1441) the Europeans did not offer a coherent strategy for dealing with the Iraqi prob-
lem. Rather, they took quite different stances on a continuum extending between early
military intervention, on the one hand, and the continuation of the containment policy
of the 1990s, on the other hand. Germany categorically opposed military action
against Iraq and ruled out any participation even in a UN-authorized intervention;14
the United Kingdom (once again) unconditionally supported the U.S.; and the veto
powers Russia and especially France sought to extract U.S. concessions – an endeavor
which has not proven completely unsuccessful. The main bone of contention between
the permanent Security Council members was whether a second resolution should be
made necessary for the use of force to be permitted in the case that Iraq would not
comply with the conditions laid down in the sought-after (first) resolution. By means
of such a requirement, the French and the Russians hoped to ensure that the Security
Council would continue to exercise its control on the issue and also to gain time in
order to increase the chances of avoiding war altogether.15 
On November 8, 2002, eventually, the Security Council unanimously passed resolu-
tion 1441, imposing on Iraq a disarmament and verification regime to be completed
within a short time-frame. The resolution does not explicitly threaten the use of force,
should Iraq refuse to comply with its obligations. However, it unambiguously reminds
Baghdad that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face “serious conse-
quences” should it continue to be in “material breach” of its obligations. From the
                                                
14 In the beginning of 2003 it looked as if the German government might soften its position. Foreign
minister Fischer indicated that Germany might not oppose a second resolution authorizing military
action if Iraq openly violated the terms of resolution 1441, although Germany’s participation in the
military intervention of a mandated “coalition of the willing” was still out of the question (Cf. “Die
Hoffnung wird immer kleiner,” Interview with foreign minister Fischer, Der Spiegel Nr. 1 (December
30,  2002), pp. 22f. and “Ratlos in New York,” ibid., pp. 20-24.) In his address to the UN Security
Council on January 20 (see Fn. 12), Fischer confirmed once again the German government’s “opposi-
tion against a military attack [on Iraq]”. (see also “Powell droht mit Krieg, Fischer mahnt zum Frie-
den” [Powell threatens war, Fischer urges peace], Spiegel Online – January 20, 2003
[http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ ausland/0,1518,231574,00.html Rev. 2003-01-21]). 
15 In the best case scenario, from the point of view of the war opponents, the extra time would have
been sufficient to prevent an U.S. intervention for the moment, considering that, due to climatic rea-
sons, fighting against Saddam’s troops would be significantly more difficult outside the winter
months.
9U.S. and British perspectives, it is crucial, however, that in this case the resolution
does not require separate Security Council authorization of further (i.e. military)
measures. Russia’s and France’s original insistence on a second resolution has been
watered down to the mere requirement of consultations, which the United States could
easily meet without being kept from using force.16
To sum up: Europeans may consider it an encouraging success that the United States
(finally) chose not to ignore the United Nations with regard to this issue; however, this
cannot obscure the fact that they obviously did not succeed in “handcuffing” the
United States,17 who could at any time convincingly threaten to do what it considers
necessary, with or without the backing of the international community.
2.3. Tense Understandings of Self and Other
These differences in addressing the Iraq issue reflect and feed a contentious constella-
tion of perceptions of self and other in the transatlantic relationship: Europeans per-
ceive the United Sates as a hegemonic power that is increasingly disregarding the
need for international cooperation, and that believes that it can ‘consume’ solidarity
without having to ‘invest’ in it to the same extent. On the part of the sole remaining
superpower, Europeans register a growing tendency towards unilateralism or, more to
the point, towards “à la carte multilateralism,” i.e. a foreign policy style characterized
                                                
16 At the beginning of 2003, when military preparations for a war were at full speed, it seemed likely
that this was how Resolution 1441 was understood by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Notably,
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell used the term “material breach” when speaking of the omissions
in the weapons report turned in by Baghdad. (Cf. “U.S. Says Iraq ‘Fails’ on Disclosure. Powell Calls
Weapons Declaration a ‘Breach’ of U.N. Resolutions,” Washington Post, December 20, 2002, p. A
01.) For a while, even German diplomats were no longer certain if a second resolution would be
needed – as the German Permanent Representative to the UN, ambassador Gunter Pleuger, pointed
out in a New York Times interview (cf. “Germany Will Not Insist on Second Vote, Envoy Says,”
New York Times, January 9, 2003 [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/09/international/europe/
09GERM.html] Rev. 2003-01-14). The avoidance of a second resolution would have taken some
pressure off the German government, being no longer forced to take a clear stand. Nevertheless, at his
press conference on January 14, 2003, Chancellor Schröder once again spoke in favor of a second UN
Security Council resolution: “I think that it is rather likely that the European partners will work to-
wards a second resolution, (. . . ) I also consider it reasonable.” ([http://
www.sueddeutsche.de/index.php?url=/deutschland/politik/60228&datei=index.php] Rev. 2003-01-
15). [In the meantime, events have taken yet another turn. In February and March 2003, the U.S. and
Britain called for a second resolution, setting Iraq a clear and narrow deadline for disarmament, while
France, Russia, and Germany denied the need for a further resolution at this stage, arguing that the
inspectors should be given more time to complete their job.] 
17 Speaking to European journalists, Colin Powell said on October 28, 2002: "By our willingness to
show flexibility on that point, we essentially believe we have accommodated those who wanted an
opportunity to decide this. They have now the opportunity to decide or not to decide it, to pass a sec-
ond resolution or offer a second resolution or not, and we will be part of that debate. We're part of that
Security Council. We had to make sure that we did not do it in such a way that a set of handcuffs were
being put upon the United States and other nations (…)." [http://www.usembassy.it/file200211/alia/
a2110106.htm] Rev. 2003-01-15.
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by the tendency to practice international cooperation through international institutions
if and only if it serves narrowly defined national interests, irrespective of the frustra-
tions this behavior is bound to cause among its partners. This hegemon possesses un-
precedented military and technological superiority18 and reserves the decision as to
when and where to use that power to itself. The Europeans reluctantly realize that
when the right to “pre-emptive defense” becomes part of the most powerful and influ-
ential country’s foreign and security policy doctrine, basic norms of international law
are being undermined – such as the general prohibition of the use of force and the role
of the Security Council as the sole institution to authorize the use of force, based on
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. However, even more than the ra-
tionally calculated U.S. realpolitik, the Europeans fear a moralistic and Manichean
neo-idealism, as being expressed in formulas such as the “axis of evil” introduced by
President Bush in his State of the Union address in January 2002.19 Against this back-
ground, the Europeans see themselves as the defenders of the principles of interna-
tional law and of an international order that is compatible with a vision of interna-
tional politics based on non-aggression, common rules, compromise, and dialogue –
an order which they seek to promote through a moderate, civilizing foreign policy
based on compromise and cooperation. 
On the other hand, the U.S. tends to see the European Union as a grouping of states
that refuses to take its share of responsibility for international security, i.e. a degree of
responsibility which corresponds to its economic power or at least its self-perception
as an important actor in international relations who is playing a key role in global
governance. Representing many political analysts who sympathize with the Bush, Jr.
administration, Robert Kagan speaks of a “power gap” between the United States and
Europe which has appeared as the Europeans have increasingly been “moving beyond
power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and
cooperation.“20  Many U.S. opinion leaders see the “old world” and its aging societies
in irrevocable decline and unable to reform their economies and social security sys-
tems. 
                                                
18 Paul Kennedy, The Greatest Superpower Ever, in: New Perspectives Quarterly 19 (2002) 3, pp. 8-
18. [http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_spring/kennedy.html] Rev. 2003-1-6.
19 William Pfaff, Thinking With a Manichaean Bent. Light vs. Darkness, International Herald Trib-
une, November 28, 2002.
20 Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, in: Policy Review No. 113 (June/July 2002) [http://
www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html] Rev. 2002-11-11. (For a book-length elaboration see his
essay: Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,  New York 2003.) – In
the meantime Kagan’s assessment of the transatlantic relationship has become part of a vigorous de-
bate. For German contributions, see Gulliver vs. Liliput. Robert Kagans "Macht und Schwäche" in der
Debatte (with contributions by Hans Arnold, Hans-Peter Dürr, Gunther Hellmann, Andrian Kreye,
Claus Leggewie, Otfried Nassauer, August Pradetto, Ulrich K. Preuß, Joscha Schmierer, Sibylle Tön-
nies, Frank Unger, Karsten D. Voigt und Werner Weidenfeld), in: Blätter für deutsche und internatio-
nale Politik 47 (2002) 11, pp. 1345-1364. 
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From the U.S. perspective, the European partners refuse to confront the threats posed
by global networks of well-financed terrorist organizations and by dictators striving to
build up their own WMD arsenals; they do so because they fear both the political con-
sequences they would have to draw from this and the reluctance of their publics to
accept the associated burdens. At the same time, they try to slow down the United
States in taking the necessary action, because they expect this to result in a further loss
of European influence on international politics or rather in Europe’s already existing
relative insignificance being exposed. The result is a policy that appears both fearful
and careless. Americans’ reaction to this policy is furious, where they see it as caused
by a cynical calculation, according to which it is not the Europeans, but the U.S. (ei-
ther exclusively or primarily) that must be afraid of “cataclysmic” terrorist attacks like
9-11. As a result, the U.S. sees itself as a nation that lives up to the challenges placed
upon it by virtue of its unique power position and that takes responsibility not only for
international security, but also for the global spread of democracy, free market econ-
omy, and human rights. Put differently: the U.S. pictures itself as a “benevolent he-
gemon,”21 providing the world with collective goods such as a minimum degree of
international security and political and economic freedom. What is more, for U.S.
policy makers, it is perfectly consistent with this mission that in their foreign policy
they give pride of place to their own country’s security and economic interests: after
all, a weakened hegemon would be unable to maintain international order and would
have to leave the world exposed to unfettered anarchy.
3.  Explanatory Approaches: What Caused the Cracks to Appear?
3.1.  Three Perspectives on International Politics
When trying to explain these conflicts and tensions in the transatlantic relationship, it
is worthwhile to look at the theories which political scientists use to explain events,
processes, and patterns of behavior in international politics. There is no consensus
among scholars of international relations (IR) on which concepts, assumptions, and
models are most appropriate to explain the (inter)actions of states and other actors of
international politics. Rather, a number of theories or “paradigms” compete with each
other. We refer here to three of these, because they stand out as particularly influential
in IR and because their basic assumptions in fact are reflected in many analyses of the
current transatlantic discontent.22
                                                
21 Duncan Snidal, Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, in: International Organization 39 (1985) 4,
pp. 579-615.
22 See also John S. Duffield, Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War. Theory, Evidence, and the
Future, in: International Studies Perspectives 2  (2001) 1, pp. 93-115. Concerning the three theories
briefly described and then applied below see Gert Krell, Weltbilder und Weltordnung. Einführung in
die Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen, Baden-Baden 2000, Chapters. 6, 8, and 11. Regarding
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The first of these theories is realism, which is based on the assumption that interna-
tional politics is about security or the maximization of one’s chances of survival. This
notion builds on the observation of a sharp contrast between domestic and interna-
tional politics. Whereas in domestic politics, rules and laws can, if need be, be
authoritatively interpreted by the judiciary and enforced by the executive, interna-
tional relations is shaped by the conditions of anarchy and the security dilemma,
which, in the final consequence, require states – as the main actors in international
politics – to rely on self-help. When push comes to shove, only that actor is capable of
effective self-help, who possesses sufficient power, i.e. sufficient military, economic,
ideological, or political-diplomatic resources both in order to force its will upon other
actors and in order to resist the demands of others. To be sure, the principle of self-
help does not rule out cooperation of states for their mutual interest. It does imply,
however, that states, knowing that today’s partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, ought
to keep an eye on the development of their own relative power position as well as on
the possibility of deception inherent in many cooperative enterprises.
From the perspective of (social) constructivism, this view of international politics is
both too simplistic and too pessimistic. “Anarchy” – according to constructivism’s
slogan – “is what states make of it,”23 i.e. power politics, security competition, dis-
trust, the latent “war of all against all,” and all the other elements of a so-called real-
politik are historically possible, but are not an unavoidable result of anarchical pre-
conditions shaping international politics. Material conditions, such as the distribution
of military or economic capabilities, do not determine the form of international rela-
tions at a given time. Instead, anarchy – i.e. the absence of a world government which
could effectively and reliably settle conflicts, removing the need for its ‘subjects’ to
resort to violent self-help – is compatible with different “cultures,” i.e. relatively sta-
ble constellations of perceptions of self and other. Here, the range of possibilities in-
cludes enmity, but also extends to mere rivalry and even to mutual responsiveness and
friendship between states. Therefore, ideational and social factors such as values,
norms, social roles, or collective identities (self-perceptions) determine the behavior
of states and other actors24 in international politics.
                                                                                                                                                       
the position of prominence these theories hold in the current IR debate see Stephen M. Walt, Interna-
tional Relations. One World, Many Theories, in: Foreign Policy 110 (1998), pp. 29-47.
23 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It. The Social Construction of Power Politics,
in: International Organization 46 (1992) 2, pp. 391-425.
24 In constructivism, social actors are constituted (first and foremost) by intersubjective meanings
rather than (exclusively or primarily) by the possession of material properties. This makes construc-
tivist theorizing much more ‘permeable’ to non-state actors than (e.g.) realism, which tends to see
international relations as the natural domain of states. 
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The third theory to be referred to in this article also distances itself from the simple
and uncomfortable ‘truths’ with which realism has always tried to dampen the hopes
for civilized international politics. As we have seen, realism assumes that international
anarchy and the power configuration existing at a certain point in time (such as he-
gemony, bipolarity, or multipolarity) determine the conditions for each and every state
by which it has to align its foreign policy if it seeks to ensure its survival and welfare
in a dangerous world. From the perspective of liberalism, this is a gross exaggeration
of the role that external factors play in shaping states’ foreign policies. In fact, the
manner in which a state conducts its foreign policy towards other states does not sim-
ply, or not even predominantly, depend on its power position. Nor is the shape of the
relations between states at a given point in time merely a function of the distribution
of power between them. Rather, foreign policy as well as international politics are
contingent on how the political process is organized within the state (or the states con-
cerned, respectively) and whose interests, due to social and political institutions and
practices in this state (or these states, respectively), run the best chances of being
taken into account by foreign policy decision makers. In particular, liberalism assumes
that democracies – whose institutions introduce various checks and balances into the
political process and make it difficult for foreign policy decision makers to shift the
costs of risky decisions to others, i.e. to the populations who they represent and whom
the depend on for their survival in office – conduct a generally more cautious, coop-
erative, and peaceful foreign policy than authoritarian states. This tendency is espe-
cially apparent in the relationship among democracies: Being capable of presenting
impressive empirical evidence for their argument, liberal theorists see the hypothesis
that democracies do not wage war against each other, as coming close to a social sci-
entific law.25
3.2. Realist, Constructivist, and Liberal Explanations of the Cracks in the Trans-
atlantic Relationship
3.2.1. Realist Perspectives
Examining the transatlantic relationship, as it has developed since the end of the Cold
War, in the light of these three theories, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that re-
alism has considerable explanatory power in this case. From the realist perspective,
foreign policy is power politics and results in states striving for autonomy and influ
                                                
25 Cf. James Lee Ray, Democracy: On the Level(s), Does Democracy Correlate With Peace?, in: What
Do We Know About War?, ed. John A. Vasquez, Lanham 2000, pp. 299-316; Anna Geis, Diagnose:
Doppelbefund – Ursache ungeklärt? Die Kontroverse um den "demokratischen Frieden", in: Poli-
tische Vierteljahresschrift 42 (2001) 2, pp. 282-298 as well as Jack S. Levy, War and Peace, in:
Handbook of International Relations, Eds. Walter Carlsnaes/Thomas Risse/Beth Simmons, London
2002, pp. 350-368.
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ence.26 States want to be autonomous in order to use their means of power in whatever
way they deem best suited to ensure their security and welfare; and they want to exert
influence on other states in order to make it as difficult as possible for the latter to use
their means of power to damage them (or first of all, to acquire the amount of power
that could endanger them). If states have to choose between autonomy and influence,
they usually decide in favor of autonomy, especially when the external threat to their
national security appears high. All states tend towards power politics, but only among
the already powerful, this tendency unfolds in an unrestricted manner – the more pow-
erful a state, the more it tends towards power politics. 
Applying these considerations to the case at hand, i.e. the development of the transat-
lantic relationship in recent years, we can state that realist expectations are largely
born out. The U.S. conducts a foreign policy that can be described as power politics,
because it seeks to increase its autonomy and influence. Where autonomy and influ-
ence clash, influence based on institutionalized cooperation gives way to autonomy,
i.e. a unilateral policy that has no “handcuffs” put on it, just as realism predicts for
times of high security pressure. Finally, this type of behavior has grown in signifi-
cance in the past few years, precisely at a time, when America’s unique power has
become ever more pronounced. This is not to say that U.S. unilateralism is a novel
phenomenon that could not be observed before George W. Bush became president.
Rather, the current U.S. foreign policy behavior is more adequately described as an
extreme variant of a hegemonic practice that already existed during the Cold War,
even as it was intensified with the fall of the second super power, i.e. the Soviet Un-
ion. Similarly, when we emphasize the new quality of the current threats to Western
(and non-Western) security, which blur the line between the domestic and the foreign,
we must not overlook that the events of September 11, 2001 are only the climax of a
number of terrorist attacks that U.S. installations faced throughout the 1990s.27
In contrast, the Europeans feel less intensely threatened. Concerning transnational ter-
rorism, the U.S. continues to be seen as the main or even single target of possible fur-
ther attacks. But views also differ concerning the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of “rogue states”: In contrast to the U.S., the Europeans do
not regard it as a realistic danger that they might become the victim of an WMD attack
launched by states like North Korea, Iraq, or Iran.28 Given this discrepancy in the per
                                                
26 Rainer Baumann / Volker Rittberger / Wolfgang Wagner, Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory, in:
German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, ed. Volker Rittberger, Manche-
ster 2001, pp. 37-67.
27 These include the first attack on the World Trade Center (February 1993; 6 deaths) as well as the
attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998; 224 deaths), and on the USS
Cole in the port of Aden (October 2000; 17 deaths).
28 Regarding the divergent assessments of the threat posed by Iraq see Kagan (Fn. 20).
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ception of threat as well as the lack of a uniform European strategy to combat these
new threats, the U.S. perceives itself as having to rely on itself and to make use of the
transatlantic power gap when organizing collective action against these dangers. Of
course, it is a matter of dispute as to whether the current strategy meets the require-
ment of prudence stressed by classical realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau29, i.e. to
what extent the strategy and tactics chosen by Washington will indeed serve the secu-
rity interests of the United States.30
3.2.2. Constructivist Perspectives
Constructivism contributes to the analysis by focusing attention on the ideational and
social dimension of the current tensions. When we pointed to the incompatibilities in
the perceptions of self and other on both sides of the Atlantic (sec. 2.3.), we implicitly
took a constructivist perspective. In the article that served as our point of departure in
this essay, Fukuyama similarly stresses the role of ideological differences within the
West resulting from different historical experiences. To him, most of the transatlantic
tension originates in a fundamental disagreement over the question of where “the ul-
timate source of liberal democratic legitimacy lies.” Fukuyama summarizes this dis-
agreement as follows:
Americans tend not to see any source of democratic legitimacy higher than
the constitutional democratic nation-state. To the extent that any interna-
tional organization has legitimacy, it is because duly constituted democratic
majorities have handed that legitimacy up to them in a negotiated, con-
tractual process. Such legitimacy can be withdrawn at any time by the con-
tracting parties. International law and organization have no existence inde-
pendent of this type of voluntary agreement between sovereign nation-
states. Europeans, by contrast, tend to believe that democratic legitimacy
flows from the will of an international community much larger than any in-
dividual nation-state. This international community is not embodied con-
cretely in a single, global democratic constitutional order. Yet it hands
down legitimacy to existing international institutions, which are seen as
partially embodying it.31
                                                
29 Cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed., New
York 1973. 
30 For a critical analysis of current U.S. foreign policy from this perspective see Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
The Paradox of American Power. Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone, Oxford 2002.
31 Fukuyama, The West May Be Cracking (Fn. 3).
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This interpretation32, of course, provokes further questions: For example, one would
like to know why and how this basic ideological disagreement has emerged in the first
place. Constructivists would seek to make the varying foreign policy identities of the
partners intelligible as the result of specific historical experiences. In this context, Gert
Krell points to the phenomenon of U.S. “exceptionalism,” the “specifically American
variant of nationalism.” The perception, extending back to the first immigrants, of
America and American society as representing a new and better way of life could help
to explain the reluctance of U.S. policymakers to accept goals and values authored,
promulgated, or embodied by international institutions. In addition to exceptionalism,
Krell refers to the pronounced individualism in American political culture that, from
the outset, has been accompanied by religious fundamentalism. “Up to the present
time, in the U.S. ‘the Evil’ is not just a religious, but also a political category (. . .)
Combined with this fundamentalist feature that can partly be attributed to Puritanism,
is a Manichean world view with a tendency towards self-elevation (Überhöhung des
Selbst).”33 In contrast, the corresponding European experiences relate to a shared his-
tory, in which nationalism and unlimited sovereignty are associated with war and de-
struction and supra-nationalism is associated with peace and welfare.
A further question suggested by this analysis is the following: Granted that the sup-
posed differences in the political culture in general and the conceptions of legitimacy
do indeed exist, they can, by their very nature, hardly have come into being in the past
few years. But if so, how can they possibly account for conflicts (or an accumulation
thereof) that we have begun to observe only recently? One possible answer suggests
itself immediately: these differences become manifest, and upset the transatlantic re-
lationship, only now, because the East-West conflict – which first and foremost was a
conflict over fundamentally divergent political values – concealed these compara-
tively minor differences.
3.2.3. Liberal Perspectives
At first glance, liberalism does not seem to have much to offer when it comes to ex-
plaining the current crisis in transatlantic relations. Rather, it helps us to understand
why cooperation within this segment of the international system (at least until now)
has been so unusually diverse, deep, and stable: According to liberals, the security
                                                
32 Fukuyama’s interpretation could be refined by referring to the socio-cultural proximity between the
United Kingdom and the U.S. which helps to account for the “special relationship“ of these two
countries – a relationship which in many regards represents a deviant case in the context of the obser-
vations made in this essay.
33 Gert Krell, Arroganz der Macht, Arroganz der Ohnmacht. Der Irak und die deutsch-amerikanischen
Beziehungen (unpublished manuscript, Frankfurt a. M. 2002).
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dilemma – which realists see as a universal condition of international politics – does
not exist or is negligible between democracies. Since they do not threaten each other’s
existence, they are willing to get involved in close mutual cooperation, even as, in this
way, they forfeit some of their decision-making autonomy and allow themselves to
become mutually dependent. Liberalism can also explain why there is no concern
among Western policy makers that the tensions might escalate into violent conflict.
NATO members form a “pluralistic security community” (Karl W. Deutsch) and this
includes the reliable expectation that conflicts are dealt with and eventually solved
without the use of force or even the threat of the use of force.
Liberalism can, however, contribute a further insight that sheds some light on the cur-
rently emerging cracks in the transatlantic relationship: From the liberal perspective,
foreign policy always has a domestic side. Governments are constantly tempted, and
sometimes succumb to this temptation, to “score points” with their publics (and, in
democracies, with their electorates) by the way they deal with foreign policy issues.
This temptation is the stronger, the more fragile the domestic power position of the
government appears, the more widespread and pronounced are opinions and senti-
ments within the population (such as patriotism or anti-Americanism) that can be at-
tended to through a conflict-accentuating foreign policy, and the smaller, or the more
easily controllable, the related damage to important foreign policy goals (such as the
preservation of one’s partners goodwill etc.) appears to be. Especially the latest trou-
bles in the German-American relationship – two countries whose governments faced
important and hotly contested nation-wide elections (Bundestagswahlen and Congres-
sional midterm elections, respectively) at the time when the tensions arose – provide
rich empirical evidence for these hypotheses.
The blunt public (and as such unprecedented) rejection by the German government of
the U.S. approach to the Iraqi issue may be partly explained by opinions prevalent in
German society. Chancellor Schröder’s talk of “der deutsche Weg” (the German
way)34 appeared to signal a break with a policy style that German governments had
practiced for decades and that was characterized by the deliberate compliance with the
collective decisions of authoritative international bodies such as the UN Security
Council. The hypothesis that the Schröder government’s position on this issue was
formulated with an eye to the upcoming Bundestagswahl is supported by the fact that
in a poll conducted shortly after the 2002 election, around 49% of the respondents
were categorically opposed to Germany’s participation in a possible war against Iraq.
However, the share of respondents who were in favor of a German participation pro
                                                
34 Gerhard Schröder introduced this phrase during his party’s election campaign in August 2002 (“Die
SPD im Wahlkampf auf einem ‘deutschen Weg’,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 8, 2002).
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vided there was a UN Security Council mandate was not much lower (46%).35 This is
a rather narrow lead and hence it is doubtful that a robust domestic-politics based ex-
planation of Germany’s extreme stance on the Iraqi issue can be provided, at least on
these terms.36 An explanation based on realist theory and referring to the German in-
crease in power after unification might be more plausible.37
Liberal theory also proves of limited value when it comes to explaining U.S. behavior
in the current Iraq debate. At any rate, one cannot speak of overwhelming support for
the deployment of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. According to opinion polls, the ap-
proval rate fell below 60% in August 2002, and at the end of October only 55% of
respondents favored a U.S. strike on Iraq.38 Despite the surprisingly low and by no
means unconditional public support,39  the behavior of the U.S. administration under
George W. Bush may in part be explained by societal factors: “By mobilizing the se-
curity argument and the threat from abroad, a government’s lack of domestic legiti-
macy or the fact that it represents particular interests is disguised.”40 Of course, further
research would be necessary to back up this claim. In any case, it is a remarkable fact
in this context that in January 2002 Americans’ confidence in the Bush administra-
tion’s competence in coping with domestic problems only received a 40:60 rating,
while its competence concerning national security and combating terrorism received a
significantly more positive 70:30 rating.41
                                                
35 Infratest dimap October 2002 [http://www.infratest-dimap.de/politik/deutschlandtrend/
dt0210/default.htm] Rev. 2002-11-12.
36 Henry Kissinger has attributed the German uncompromising and, from an U.S. point of view, dis-
loyal stance to what he interprets as the new political elite’s “anti-Americanism.” See Kissinger, The
“Made in Berlin” Generation, Washington Post, October 30, 2002.
37 For a detailed analysis of German foreign policy since unification on the basis of the theories men-
tioned in this article, see German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, ed.
Volker Rittberger, Manchester/New York 2001.
38 Clear differences between the German and U.S. publics emerge with regard to the question of
whether Saddam Hussein should be removed from power. While among U.S. respondents 62% favour
such a measure, only 33% of German respondents are favourable. (The Pew Research Center [http://
people-press.org/reports/] Rev. 2002-12-29).
39 More recent polls indicate broader approval within the U.S. public for the hard line taken by the
Bush, Jr. administration. According to these polls, in mid-January 2003 more than two thirds (68%) of
the respondents favored military action against Iraq. However, these findings remain ambiguous. For,
at the same time, only 30% favored an attack on Iraq if efforts should fail to prove that the country
possesses weapons of mass destruction (The Pew Research Center [http://people-press.org/reports/]
Rev. 2003-01-18).
40 Krell (Fn. 33).
41 Krell (Fn. 33). Another liberal explanation of the ‘Atlantic rift’ is based on the “domestic analogy,”
i.e. the tendency of states to reproduce in their foreign policy their domestically practiced political and
social behaviour such as, e.g., strategies to deal with conflicts. Thus, Tony Judt argues that differences
between U.S. and European societies are growing and that this development is a root cause for di-
verging postures of the Western partners vis-à-vis questions of international politics, see Tony Judt,
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4. Pondering Solutions: How to Mend the Cracks?
The preceding discussion of IR theory-based explanations for the recent strains in the
transatlantic relationship has concentrated on issues of international security. Turning
to possible strategies for mending ‘the cracks in the West,’ the emphasis is once again
on this issue area. This focus is certainly not inevitable: after all, it is obviously not the
case that in other issue areas such as money, trade, or the environment the European-
American relationship is characterized by anything resembling pure harmony. Never-
theless, security relations are special in this context justifying devoting particular at-
tention to them. For while the tensions in various low-politics issue areas can be inter-
preted as symptoms of a continuing competitive relationship that existed long before
the end of the Cold War, comparable conflicts in the issue area of security coopera-
tion, which formed the backbone of the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War,
have emerged in this intensity and frequency only in recent years.42 If security issues
are at the heart of  the present crisis, then devising adequate and mutually acceptable
strategies for responding to the new security threats – such as transnational terrorism
and “rogue states” which possess weapons of mass destruction – are central to a sus-
tainable re-definition of the foundations and the tasks of the Western alliance or trans-
atlantic community.43 
4.1. Realism: Balancing through Upgrading European Security and Defense Co-
operation
Accepting Kagan’s argument that the different approaches to international politics
practiced on either side of the Atlantic are largely due to the power gap between
America and Europe,44 an appropriate response would be the creation of a European
countervailing power – an ambition that is predicted by realist theory and termed
“balancing.” Even when, in the foreseeable future, the objective and subjective secu
                                                                                                                                                       
Its Own Worst Enemy, in: New York Review of Books August 15, 2002 ([http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/15632] Rev. 2003-03-10).
42 France’s withdrawal from the military arm of NATO in 1966 is a notable exception. Also, the re-
curring conflicts over the burden-sharing within the alliance are vaguely related. 
43 Other observers also emphasize the need for a re-definition of the relationship (as opposed to a
mere renewal along traditional lines). For instance, discussing the German-American relationship,
Jackson Janes and Cathleen Fischer state: “undits on both sides of the Atlantic are predicting that
German-American relations will never again be the same. They are right. (...) That is because both
Germany and the United States are still struggling to come to terms with their respective ‘/11s’[i.e.
September 11 (2001) and the 9th of November (1989), respectively].” (Jackson Janes / Cathleen
Fisher, Depersonalizing Politics – Focusing on Policy, Washington, D.C. 2002: American Institute for
Contemporary German Studies [www.aicgs.org/at-issue/ai-depersonalizing.shtml] Rev. 2002-11-11).
44 Kagan (Fn. 20).
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rity threats posed by “rogue states” may be less for Europe than for the U.S., strength-
ening Europe’s power position appears to be a rational policy goal as it would remove
some of the pressure now burdening the transatlantic relationship. From a realist per-
spective in any case, America’s superiority is a threat to the autonomous development
of Europe, threatening to split Europe up, and therefore runs counter to fundamental
European interests, particularly if it increasingly leads to unilateral action by the U.S.,
which, at present, the Europeans are unable to prevent or influence effectively.
The formation of a European countervailing power would have to include a strength-
ening of its military capabilities. In particular, the EU would need to speed up and in-
tensify the process of building a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),45 al-
though balancing in this case would have to go beyond military-political reforms. On
the political level, closer coordination and ultimately a greater unanimity of the Euro-
pean Union in matters of security would be required. The question of Iraq has once
more shown that such unity only continues to be lacking, but is fostered by the exist-
ing transatlantic power gap. The formation of a countervailing power through a sig-
nificantly enhanced and intensified ESDP would not necessarily (and should not) have
a confrontational character. Rather, a new form of transatlantic division of labor could
be habituated: Europeans would increasingly live up to the American expectations of
the Europeans taking greater responsibility for peace and stability in their own neigh-
borhood and would be able to support the Americans more effectively in selected re-
gions outside the European continent.46 At the same time, Europe would become less
dependent on the United States. As a result, the Europeans, in case of a dissent over
security policy, would be less sensitive to the U.S. threatening (however implicitly) to
reduce its commitment to European stability. In fact, such a new division of labor
might provide the Europeans with an as yet unknown influence on Washington’s secu-
rity-political decisions. Commenting on Kagan’s theses, Werner Weidenfeld con-
cludes: “What our continent needs in order to be a global actor and to be taken seri-
ously in times of crisis, is a strategic idea of Europe.” 47  
                                                
45 The European Council in Cologne on June 3 and 4, 1999 is generally considered as the ESDP’s date
of birth. The first initiatives can be traced back to the Maastricht treaty (1992), if not further. Within
the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this treaty established for the first time
the responsibility of the European Union concerning all matters of security and defense policy (Art.
17 TEU, formerly Art. J.7).
46 Cf. Helga Haftendorn, One Year after 9/11. A Critical Appraisal of German-American Relations.
Lecture delivered on September 17, 2002 at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
[http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/haftendorn.pdf] Rev. 2002-11-11.
47 Werner Weidenfeld, Gesucht: Europa als strategische Idee, in: Blätter für deutsche und internatio-
nale Politik 47 (2002) 11, pp. 1363f.
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However, given the very limited financial resources in most European countries, it is
questionable whether such a strategy can be successfully pursued in the foreseeable
future. That is, even though inspired by (political) realism, the strategy may ironically
be doomed due to a lack of realism.48 If the worst comes to the worst, proceeding
down this road leads into a cul-de-sac. This would be the case if the U.S. would de-
mand from the Europeans ever more substantial contributions to its hegemonic world
order policy now that they are able to provide it, while at the same time the European
influence would remain modest, because its improved power resources are still way
below the threshold at which they would begin to become politically significant.49
4.2.  Constructivism: Dialogue of Cultures
Devising a constructivist explanation for the growing tensions in the European-
American relationship we, following Fukuyama, have pointed out the divergent un-
derstandings of the locus of legitimacy in international politics: While for Americans
legitimacy comes bottom-up rather than top-down, the Europeans view the interna-
tional community as a source of legitimacy outside the nation-state. The solution that
corresponds to this explanation is easily formulated in general terms; yet, its imple-
mentation, is everything but easy. From the European perspective, the goal must be to
strengthen the loyalty of U.S. political decision-makers to multilateral agreements and
organizations. In light of the ‘consumption’ of solidarity practiced by the U.S. as a
matter of course, especially during the past two years, this approach does not seem to
hold much promise in the short term, though. Still, a few recent developments nourish
hope that the U.S. might revise its UN policy in the foreseeable future. A case in point
is the U.S. rejoining UNESCO, which it left in 1984. The fact that in the case of Iraq –
in contrast to the Clinton administration during the Kosovo conflict – President Bush
and his Secretary of State Powell have, despite their criticism, eventually chosen to
seek a UN Security Council resolution, may be seen as another hint in this direction.
On the other hand, it is plain that these steps and gestures should not be overrated,
                                                
48 U.S. military expenditures amount to approximately $ 300 billion annually. All EU member states
taken together spend “only” $ 130 billion on defense ([http://www.sipri.org] Rev. 2002-12-29). In
addition, U.S. military expenditures are scheduled to grow in the coming years in order to meet the
needs of the war against terror: while the military expenditures have already reached $ 330.6 billion
(= 3.24 % of GDP) in 2002, $ 369 billion are earmarked for the Pentagon in the 2003 budget, and in
2007 defense spending is to amount to $ 442 billion ([http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2003/] Rev. 2002-12-29).
49 Leaving aside the effects on the transatlantic relationship, it is questionable as to whether the
planned modernization of weapons systems and increasing of personnel (currently, 60,000 troops are
to be earmarked for the rapid deployment force to be established in 2003) will provide adequate pro-
tection against the new security threats. This is because even the most advanced weapons systems are
of only limited use in asymmetrical wars.  
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especially since a case can be made without much difficulty that instrumental interests
shape the recent U.S. behavior towards the United Nations.
Meanwhile, constructivism does not argue that a state’s foreign policy identity
changes over night. Nor, as a rule, does such a change occur spontaneously. An in-
strument to promote change of basic understandings of self and other from the outside
is the dialogue of cultures – the anti-thesis, if you will, to Huntington’s “Clash of
Civilizations.”50 A prerequisite of genuine dialogue is empathy (usually itself the
product of long-term learning processes). Empathy involves overcoming one’s own
ethnocentrism and developing the ability and willingness to put oneself in the other’s
shoes. “Everyone must be able to locate his or her own individual, collective, national
world within the other possible worlds, and to view it from a different/alien perspec-
tive.”51  An important step in this direction is gaining knowledge about other nations,
cultures, and religions, and taking seriously their quest for respect and for being rec-
ognized as equal in worth and rights. One does not go out on a limb by asserting that
the cultural ties between Europe and the U.S. are still rather strong and that both sides
form part of a single civilization. Thus, a strategy of promoting the “dialogue of cul-
tures” does not face insurmountable obstacles, although cultural differences that do
exist between the U.S. and “the old Europe” deserve more attention and serious study.
We have to launch and maintain a dialogue that takes place on many levels, examin-
ing the sources of the transatlantic misunderstandings and resentments that continue to
burden the European-American relationship for all the indisputable “cultural proxim-
ity” of the Western partners.
A much greater challenge is of course involved in initiating and conducting success-
fully a dialogue with representatives of Islamic culture. Here the goal must be to re-
duce the subjective (i.e. mutually perceived) threats by increasing knowledge and un-
derstanding of one another. Dialogue can also be hampered by adverse social and
material conditions. Politics can lead the way: through prudent legislation, the inte-
gration of immigrants may be alleviated; and in foreign economic policy, Western
states should work towards international regimes that promote social justice on the
                                                
50 Huntington’s slogan is misleading because the central “fault line” runs not between, but within
cultures. This intra-cultural clash occurs between secularized social strata (which often include ele-
ments of the authoritarian ruling elites, but also elements of the opposition fighting authoritarian neo-
patrimonialism) and religious counter-forces (that argue for a conservation or resuscitation of holy
traditions or rally around charismatic leaders who instrumentalize religion to create a collective iden-
tity). This is rather obvious within Islam, but not exclusive to it. In the U.S., the “religious right” ad-
vocates the return to a supposedly glorious and virtuous past as do numerous Islamist groups in the
Middle East. Cf. Edda Heiligsetzer, Religiös-fundamentalistischer Terrorismus im Vergleich. Extre-
mistischer Protestantismus in den USA und fundamentalistische Gewalt im islamischen Orient, in:
Die Friedens-Warte 76 (2001) 1, pp. 81-100.
51 Ludwig Liegle, Dialog der Kulturen (unpublished lecture, Tübingen 2002).
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global level. In addition, multilateral fora should be used to promote and strengthen,
within the Islamic states and other developing countries, the notion that democracy is
not a purely Western concept or project, but a system of rule that is compatible with,
and desirable for, many cultures.
The United Nations system in particular can serve as such a forum, and it has explic-
itly offered to assume this role. Thus, the General Assembly proclaimed 2001 as the
“international year of dialogue among civilizations.” In September 2000, this dialogue
had been the topic of a round table at UN headquarters initiated by the Iranian presi-
dent, Mohammed Khatami, and chaired by the Secretary-General of UNESCO, Koi-
chiro Matsuura.52 In the future, these initial steps will have to be followed up on all
levels, including the local and national levels.
4.3. Liberalism: Reducing the Dependency on Oil Imports and Democratization
Liberalism (in a way similar to constructivism) suggests a strategy that immediately
addresses the new threats to Western national security and is thus indirectly capable of
improving the transatlantic relationship. The focus of this strategy is less on the sub-
jective dimension of these threats, but rather on institutional constraints on societal or
governmental interests that dispose states to use force as part of their foreign policy.
From the liberal perspective, democratization as a comprehensive strategy of peace
holds the key to the solution. The liberal theory of international relations is, however,
dependent on ‘cooperation’ with research on political transition, whose task is to pro-
vide a complex understanding of the conditions under which democratization is likely
to take place and to take root, focusing, inter alia, on the relationship between
authoritarian elites and reformers.53 Such an understanding is particularly needed in
this case, since the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, including many oil-
producing states, have proven especially resistant to democratizing tendencies that
have succeeded in other regions of the world.54 They include states that support or
tolerate terrorist groups and also ones that, as for example Iraq or Iran, may pursue
their own WMD programs. All obstacles to democratization do not originate in these
countries, though. By virtue of their insatiable hunger for energy the highly developed
                                                
52 See also Ahmad Kamal Abu-l-Magd et al., Crossing the Divide. Dialogue among Civilizations,
South Orange, NJ 2001 as well as The World Bank, Dialogue Across Cultures, May 2-3, 2003. A
Summary of the Proceedings [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Dialogue/
$File/Dialogue-Report.pdf] Rev. 2003-01-15.
53 A seminal text is Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress. Studies of Economic Policy-
Making in Latin America, New York 1965.
54 Cf. Peter Pawelka, Der orientalische Staat: zur Resistenz patrimonialer und autoritärer Systeme in
einer globalisierten Welt, in: Entwicklung – Demokratie – Frieden. Schwerpunkte Tübinger Politik-
wissenschaft, ed. Volker Rittberger, Baden-Baden 2003, pp. 145-164.
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Western industrial societies contribute to the strengthening of such regimes and their
leaders: High oil rents create “rentier states,” whose governments – relieved of the
pressure to democratize that tax-dependent states experience (“no taxation without
representation”) – can and do use these oil rents to avoid democratic and economic
reforms.
This provides Western democracies with potential leverage: oil rents flowing to
authoritarian rulers in the Middle East could be reduced significantly as a result of the
most important consuming nations, namely Europe, America, and Japan, undertaking
coordinated, effective efforts to reduce their (dependence on) oil imports, especially
from the region under consideration. Such efforts are possible and promising and, at
least in principle, enjoy a high degree of public support. One has to keep in mind,
however, that some well-organized interest groups and large companies who benefit
from the current energy policy have significant influence on the foreign policy of oil-
importing countries. Re-aligning import interests thus requires a long-term process of
intra-state bargaining and debate that has to involve society as a whole.
Putting into practice this ambitious and time-consuming project of significantly re-
ducing Western dependence on fossil fuels would be a key contribution to a peace-
promoting policy based on a combination of sustainability and political change and
might replace high risk strategies of externally-imposed democratic reforms or “re-
gime change.”55 In this statement the subjunctive mood must not be overlooked, how-
ever. At present, the prospects for a turn-round of Western energy policy appear rather
dim indeed – despite the growing indications of man-made climate change. This is
certainly true for the United States, whose government has just declared that it consid-
ers a large increase in its own (as well as in the global) demand for oil in the coming
decades unavoidable. It expects the share of imports in the U.S. oil consumption to
grow from currently 55 % to 70% in the next 25 years.56 Viewed against the back-
ground of the previous observation, a contradiction in U.S. strategy towards the Mid-
dle East comes in sight: its foreign policy vision of a democratic Middle East, in
which human rights are respected, economy and society develop and modernize, and
                                                
55 Cf. Bruno Schoch, Der 11. September als Quittung? Nicht das Sündenregister der USA, die ver-
säumte Demokratisierung ist die Ursache des Terrorismus, Frankfurt a. M.: Hessische Stiftung Frie-
dens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK-Standpunkte 6/2001) as well as Volker Rittberger, Herausforde-
rungen für die Friedensforschung nach dem 11. September 2001 aus der Sicht der Politikwissenschaft,
in: S+F 20 (2002) 4. Concerning the relationship of oil imports and authoritarian states see also Mi-
chael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, in: World Politics 53 (2001) 3, pp. 325-361. Concerning
the rentier-state concept see Martin Beck, Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation
und politische Rente im Vorderen Orient, Wiesbaden 2002, pp. 103-161
56 Cf. Michael Renner, Post-Saddam Energy Visions: Cheap Oil, International Herald Tribune, Janu-
ary 17, 2003.
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radical ideologies and terrorism have lost their appeal,57 is undermined by its own
conservative foreign economic and energy policy – a contradiction that it cannot solve
but by force.
This said, the proposed long-term peace strategy is not devoid of risk, either. Theo-
retical arguments and empirical findings suggest that the process of democratization,
i.e. the transition to a stable democratic peace, may be especially violence-prone. If
authoritarian regimes become vulnerable as a result of reduced rent flows, then the
possibility always exists that they use violence to compensate for the reduction of this
type of income. The Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1990 may well be a case in point.58
5.  Conclusion
The strategies we have outlined are far from easy and certain solutions. They demon-
strate, however, that possibilities exist to mend the cracks in the Western alliance.
Moreover, these strategies, even though they are suggested by different schools of
thought in IR, need not be regarded as mutually exclusive options. They may be pur-
sued simultaneously in order to, in the long term, trigger a re-definition of the transat-
lantic relationship satisfying both sides. The strategy based on realism centering on
the upgrading of the ESDP directly addresses the European-American relationship and
seeks to mitigate the imbalance that has occurred. The strategy based on liberalism to
reduce the dependence on oil imports could, in the long term, result in a significant
reduction of the security threats posed by transnational terrorism and authoritarian
“rogue states,” thus – as a desired side effect – relieving the transatlantic relationship.
The constructivist solution of a politically-orchestrated “dialogue of cultures” ad-
dresses subjective security threats by attempting to create a better understanding
across the different cultures and life-worlds on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in
the “West” and the “South.” Each of the proposed strategies, however, builds on the
willingness on both sides of the Atlantic to take seriously the reciprocal dependence as
well as the common vulnerability and to resist the temptation to shift the problems and
burdens onto the respective other side.
                                                
57 Cf. Münkler (Fn. 10).
58 Martin Beck made us aware of this dilemma. Concerning the transition risks of the democratic
peace, see Edward Mansfield / Jack D. Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of War, in: Interna-
tional Security 20 (1995) 1, pp. 5-38.
